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ARTICLE
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: NEW
DIRECTIONS?
GERALD J. RUSSELLOI
INTRODUCTION: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has built a reputation as an
intellectually rigorous and forcefully progressive state supreme
court. The Court, especially during the seventeen years (1979-
96) it was led by the dominating presence of its late Chief
Justice, Robert Wilentz, represented to some the best answer to
Justice William Brennan's call for a "new federalism" that
I Litigation Associate, Covington & Burling. B.A., Georgetown University, 1992; J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 1996. Clerk, Hon. Daniel J. O'Hern, Supreme Court
of New Jersey; Clerk Hon. Leonard I. Garth, United States Court of Appeals of the Third
Circuit. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author only and not Covington &
Burling. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Northeastern Political
Science Association, 32nd Annual Conference in November 2000. I would like to thank
Professors Robert F. Williams and G. Alan Tarr, and Kevin Walsh, Mara Zazzali and
Michael Carton for their comments and assistance. I would also like to thank Greta
Boeringer of the Covington & Burling library and the New Jersey Administrative Office of
the Courts.
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encouraged the state judiciaries to expand on the basic structure
of individual rights within their particular state constitutional
frameworks. 2 In a famous article abridged from a lecture given
to the New Jersey Bar Association, Justice Brennan stated that
"[olur states are not mere provinces of an all powerful central
government," and contended that the state courts should reach
into their own constitutional histories in order to decide cases.
Since that time, a number of state Supreme Courts have done
just that, basing their decisions on the individual state
constitutions, particularly in areas such as individual rights.
This judicial revolution has been accompanied by an explosion in
legal and social science commentary examining the decisions of
state courts and their "policy making" role in the political process
of the states.3
Chief Justice Wilentz resigned from the Court in 1996.
Deborah Poritz, who at the time was serving as Republican
Governor Christine Todd Whitman's Attorney General, replaced
him. Wilentz' departure as Chief Justice has been only the most
dramatic of a number of personnel changes. With the
appointment in early 2000 of James R. Zazzali to replace retiring
Daniel J. O'Hern, six of the seven current Justices have been
appointed by Governor Whitman. Justice Gary Stein, appointed
by Governor Brendan Byrne, now remains the sole non-Whitman
appointee. Despite this fact, however, only three of the Justices
2 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1977) (urging states against complacency once they
ensure citizens' constitutional rights); see also Norman Dorsen, A Tribute To Justice
William J Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 15, 17-18 (1990) (illustrating Justice
Brennan's extensive successes and failures in civil liberty cases); Stewart G. Pollock,
Robert N Wilentz: Defender of Judicial Independence, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 327
(1997); Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, The New Jersey Supreme Court, and State
Constitutions: The Evolution of a State Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J.
763, 763 (1998) (describing Brennan's impact on development of state constitutional law).
3 See James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A
Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (2000) (discussing quantitative
investigations of new judicial federalism); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten
Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding 94
MICH. L. REV. 615, 615 (1995) (analyzing recent pro-Federalism constitutional decisions
against different framers' intents); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 761 (1992) (suggesting lack of focus on state
constitutions stems from few communities debating them); G. Alan Tarr, Understanding
State Constitutions 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1176-78 (1992) (highlighting state
constitutions' specific addressing of issues like livestock health, environment and public
schooling); see also Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionahsm: Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999) (using states' marriage rights to
illustrate how judicial interpretation and democratic norms of majority rule shape state
constitutionalism); G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (1998).
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are Republicans, Deborah Poritz, Peter Verniero and Stein, with
James H. Coleman. Virginia Long and James R. Zazzali being
registered Democrats, Justice LaVecchia's party affiliation is
unknown. While analysis of the effect of party affiliation on
judicial opinions through political party affiliation has produced
results of some correlation, as studies of the federal bench have
shown, the effects should not be exaggerated.4 In Ashenfelter's
large study of civil rights cases three federal district courts
revealed no significant differences in outcomes between
Democratic and Republican judges.5
This rapid change in the Court's membership may have lasting
effects on the Court's jurisprudence, which may in turn affect
other state courts for which the New Jersey Supreme Court has
been a model. This paper will examine key decisions since 1996
to determine whether this significant shift in membership has
caused a substantive shift in the Court's approach to the
controversial issues that has made it a leader in state supreme
courts. In particular, we will examine selected decisions in the
areas of individual rights, intra-state relations and federalism,
and the rights of plaintiffs, especially in the employment context.
First, some numbers. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the
1995 term, the last full term of the Wilentz Court, decided
seventy-seven signed opinions. In 1996-97, the Court issued
ninety-seven signed majority opinions, and 19 per curiam
opinions. From 1996-1997 through the 2000-2001 terms, the
Poritz Court has issued an average of 85 majority opinions and
26 per curiam opinions. 6 The dissent rate has remained
4 See Michael Heise, Gregory C. Sisk, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377,
1388-89 (1998) (noting that political affiliation of judges is not always determinative of
voting behavior) [hereinafter "Charting"]; see also Neil D. McFeeley, Book Review, 1984
DuKE L.J. 621, 621 passim (1984) (reviewing ROBERT CARP & C.K ROWLAND,
POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983)); Jackson
Williams, Irreconcilable Principles: Law, Politics, and the Illinois Supreme Court, 18 N.
ILL.U. L. REV. 267, 327 (1998) (noting appearance of judicial partisanship "may be eroding
the legitimacy of the court as an institution").
5 See Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Steven J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary. The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
257, 281 (1995) (concluding individual judge characteristics do not forecast civil rights
case results) [hereinafter "Ashenfelter"]. But see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (concluding
that political ideology plays significant role in judicial decision-making in D.C. Circuit).
See generally Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State
Supreme Courts, 54 J. OF POLITICS 427 (1992).
6 Administrative Office of the Courts, Opinion Reports for stated terms. (on file with
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relatively consistent, from approximately thirty percent in the
Poritz Court's first term (33 out of 97 opinions), to 38 percent in
the 2000-01 term (29 out of 76 opinions).
A Legacy of Reform
As professors G. Alan Tarr and Mary Porter have noted, since
World War II "the New Jersey Supreme Court has assumed a
role of leadership in the development of legal doctrine, thereby
earning for itself a national reputation for activism and liberal
reformism."7 That was not always the case. Prior to the 1947
reforms, the New Jersey court system was long renowned for its
Dickensian procedures and backwardness. "If you want to see
the common law in all its picturesque formality, with its fictions
and fads, its delays and uncertainties, the place to look for them
... is in New Jersey."8 In 1947, the state's voters approved a
constitutional convention and the selection of delegates by the
legislature; the new constitution was ratified later that year.9
The structural reforms stemming from the 1947 Constitution
enabled the Court to take a more "activist" role in deciding its
cases. These reforms included greater control of the Court, and
particularly the Chief Justice, over the legal profession and the
judiciary, the method of appointment of the justices and the
absence of initiative and referendum.10 For example, Article VI.
editors).
7 G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and
Nation 184 (1984). See Kevin M. Mulcahey, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built
the Most Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 863 (2000) (examining range of New Jersey cases). See generally Alan B.
Handler, Judging Public Policy, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 301 (2000) (exploring role of public
policy in judicial decision-making).
8 DENNIS W. BROGAN, THE ENGLISH PEOPLE: IMPRESSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 108
(Hamish Hamilton 1943). See John A. Boyle, Returning To Its Roots: An Examination of
the 1998 Amendments to the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 310,
314-17 (1999) (illustrating one of procedural problems of New Jersey court system prior to
1947); John B. Wefmg, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Filly Years of
Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS-CAM L.J. 701, 711 (1998) (noting criticism
regarding New Jersey court system prior to 1947).
9 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 13-17 (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, Number
1) (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 1990).
10 See id. at 16 (depicting judicial streamlining as product of one hundred years of
attempted reform). See generally Mulcahey, supra note 7, at 863 (praising New Jersey
Supreme Court as leader of activism); Justice Daniel J. O'Hern, The New Jersey
Constitution: A Charter to be Cherished, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 827, 827 (1997)
(voicing admiration for Constitution and discouraging its alteration); Justice Stewart G.
Pollock, Celebrating Fily Years of Judicial Reform Under the 1947 New Jersey
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Section II, paragraph 3 of the state Constitution provides that
the Court has the power to "make rules governing the
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law,
the practice and procedure in all such courts.""1 In a major
decision, Winberry v. Salisberry, the Court interpreted this
provision as prohibiting the state legislature from enacting any
rules regarding practice or procedure, and placing rule-making in
that area solely within the Court's power.12
Under the current state Constitution, the governor nominates
and appoints the Justices, with the advice and consent of the
state Senate.13 After seven years, each Justice is subject to
reappointment; if reappointed the Justice serves during good
behavior until the mandatory retirement age of seventy, or
earlier retirement. 14
These structural reforms have included unstated or
unanticipated practices, such as the maintenance of a balance on
the Court between members of the two major political parties,
the generally moderate political position of the Governors during
this period, and the competence and long tenures of the
justices.15  While not dispositive, the increasing use of an
"institutional" analysis of judicial decision-making should take
Constitution, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 675 (1998) (paying tribute to New Jersey Constitution
and those who developed it).
11 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 7, para. 1 (West Publishing1971) (appointing Chief
Justice as administrative head of state court system).
12 See Williams, supra note 9, at 96-97 (outlining court's broad and narrow uses of
rule making powers); see also Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 406 (N.J. 1950) (finding
state's supreme court rule-making power not subject to legislative override, but rather
based on court's practices and procedures), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950). See
generally Note, Some Observations on the Tenth Anniversary of Winberry v. Salisbury.
Quo Vadimus?, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 608, 608 (1960) (commenting New Jersey Supreme
Court has plenary rule-making power).
13 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1 (West Publishing 1971) (granting governor
power to appoint state court justices with state senate confirmation); see also Williams,
supra note 9, at 101 (relating that New Jersey has never had elected judiciary).
14 See N.J. CONST. art. VI § 6, para. 3; see also Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 40 N.J. Super.
151, 166-68 (1956), afTd, 40 N.J. Super. 301, affd, 22 N.J. 200 (ruling that tenure
acquired only after receiving reappointment after initial seven year term). See generally
Williams, supra note 9, at 101-102 (noting that while New Jersey Supreme Court has
appointed judiciary, state does not follow federal model of single lifetime appointment for
judges).
15 See Wefing, supra note 8, at 710; see also Mulcahey, supra note 7, at 897-900
(positing that New Jersey's strong judiciary results from constitutional foundation that
restructured courts into unified judiciary with powerful Chief Justice and with wide
discretion for judicial review which provided for tenure of justices free from political
process). See generally Tarr & Porter supra note 7, at 184.
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these institutional arrangements into account. 16
The Court gained its modern reputation through
groundbreaking rulings in a number of areas. 17 The Mount
Laurel decision altered the face of housing policy in New Jersey
directly and, by example, across the nation.18 Robinson v. Cah'll
and the Abbott cases have fleshed out the meaning of the New
Jersey Constitution's "thorough and efficient education" clause' 9
and provided a model for state constitutional interpretation.20
These cases found that funding education through local property
taxes violated the "thorough and efficient" education clause. The
cases articulated and developed the right to a thorough and
efficient public school education despite residence in a poor
district.
Further, the Court has continued to struggle with the State's
endorsement of capital punishment, establishing and monitoring
a range of procedures, most significantly that of proportionality
16 James L. Gibson, Decision Making in Appellate Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 255 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson, ed., 1991) thereinafter
"GATES & JOHNSON"]. See generally Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238 (1981) (discussing how interdisciplinary study of legal
education seeks to explain how legal changes affect legal institutions). Compare C.
HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES,
1937-1947 (1948).
17 See, e.g., Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assoc., 876 F. Supp. 625, 636 (D.N.J.
1994) ("Certainly one must recognize that the New Jersey Supreme Court has been and
remains a national leader among the states in developing and refining the common
law.. ."); see also Wefing supra note 8, at 702 n.3 (citing language in Hakimoglu
indicating that New Jersey courts have been active court in expanding concept of tort
liability). See generally Mulcahey, supra note 7, at 864 (characterizing New Jersey
Supreme Court as activist in nature).
18 Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975) (finding land use regulations unlawful because excluded low and moderate
income families). See DAVID KIRP, OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF
SUBURBIA (1995) (discussing case); Wefing, supra note 8, at 704 (commenting on case as
exemplary of Court's liberal and activist stance).
19 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 ("The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all
the children in the state between the ages of five and eighteen years.").
20 See Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457
(N.J. 1976): Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976): Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975): Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975): Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65
(N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
See G. Alan Tarr, Robinson v. Cahill and the New Judicial Federalism, 59 ALB. L. REV
1753, 1753-1755; Wefmg, supra note 8, at 703-704; see also Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d
1032 (N.J. 2000); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d
417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) and Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d
359 (N.J. 1990). This line of cases continued the Court's activist educational policy by
finding Governor Whitman's funding statutes unconstitutional and ordering that the
state spend hundreds of millions of dollars on its poorer urban districts. Tarr, supra note
20, at 1755.
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review, designed to ensure a fair and uniform treatment of
capital cases.21 This oversight has resulted in not one execution
since the reinstatement of capital punishment by the other two
branches twenty years ago.22 In ruling against surrogate mother
contracts in the Baby Mcase, the Court (speaking through Chief
Justice Wilentz) famously stated that "[t]here are, in a civilized
society, some things that money cannot buy."23
What is just as remarkable as the decisions themselves is the
fact that the Court has not hesitated to retain control over these
issues, sometimes for years, in a continued effort of oversight and
supervision to enforce its constitutional vision. The first school-
funding case, for example, was decided in 1973; the most recent,
in 2000. Beginning with Doe v. Poritz,24 the Court has taken a
similar track with cases interpreting a statute requiring
community notification of convicted sex offenders, the so-called
"Megan's Law."25  While the Court upheld the law and
acknowledged a social value in protecting victims, the Court still
softened what it thought were the law's harsh features. The New
Jersey experience has confirmed the conclusion of political
science research, as Charles Sheldon and Nicholas Lovrich point
out, that "[clourts make public policy and, consequently, are
21 See Handler, supra note 7, at 318-21 (explaining New Jersey's proportionality
review process); see also Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality
Review of Capital Cases (With Lessons From New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1164
(stating that New Jersey Supreme Court is committed to most quantitative
proportionality review in United States). But cf Karen L. Folster, High Court Studies:
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1990s: Independence is Only Skin Deep, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 1501, 1504-1505 (1999) (arguing against independence of New Jersey Supreme
Court as revealed by record of death penalty cases).
22 See Andrea E. Girolamo, Punishment or Politics? New York State's Death Penalty,
7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 135 (1998) (discussing that New Jersey, where death penalty
has been legal since 1982, has yet to execute one person).
23 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988). See Lynn Mather, Policy Making in
State Trial Courts, in GATES & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 137-38 (explaining that New
Jersey courts were forced to invent new law because case involved problem not
contemplated by existing laws); Michael E. Solimine, Book Review, Activism and Politics
on State Supreme Courts: State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
987, 992-993 (indicating that Baby M was important in overall transformation of New
Jersey court system).
24 662 A.2d 367 (N.J 1995) (citing statute commonly referred to as "Megan's Law").
25 See N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-1 (Bender 2000) (requiring registration of sex offenders who
have acted against children); see also Elga A. Goodman, Megan's Law: The New Jersey
Supreme Court Navigates Uncharted Waters, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 764, 798 (1996)
(explaining how law operates and remains within constitutional bounds); Jonathan
Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 1111, 1134-42 (2000) (defining Megan's Law as law on new model giving power
through knowledge to community instead of vesting power in judge or other state official).
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clearly among those actors in society who wield the government
sword."26
The New Court.
Almost immediately upon her arrival at the Court, there was
speculation as to how Poritz' leadership would compare with the
legacy of Wilentz.27 Poritz was thought to be more conservative
than her predecessor and would lead the Court away from the
activism and innovative legal thinking that had defined the
Wilentz years. In New Jersey, the heavy administrative burdens
placed on the Chief Justices reduce their opinion output, and
they traditionally have issued fewer opinions. The opinions of
the Chief have accordingly tended to deal with issues having
major public policy implications.2 8 This pattern has held true for
Poritz, as she produced only three opinions from the arguments
in her first term. Since she has been on the Supreme Court
bench, Poritz has maintained that pace, producing a total of
seventeen opinions for the Court through the 2000-01 term, and
only five dissents, one each in the last two terms. This number
compares favorably with Wilentz, who authored forty-seven
majority opinions in his tenure, an average of 2.76 per term.
Additionally, in his term as Chief, Wilentz authored only a dozen
dissents.
Poritz's first three opinions have perhaps foreshadowed the
direction she would take the Court. In State v. JG.29 and New
Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit,30 both
decided unanimously and issued on the same day, the Court
26 See Charles H. Sheldon and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., State Judicial Recruitment, in
GATES & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 162; see also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial
Federalism: Current Trends and Long-Term Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1053, 1084-
1089 (1992) (envisioning expanded role for state appellate courts in formulating creative
solutions for nascent problems in society). See generally Robert W. Malmsheimer and
Donald W. Floyd, Fishing Rights in Nontidal, Navigable NewYork State Rivers: A
Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 147, 173 (explaining how
courts make public policy differently than their legislative and executive counterparts).
27 Henry Gottlieb, "The Wilentz Court Evolves Under Poritz," 151 N.J.L.J. 217 (1998).
28 See Wefmg, supra, note 8, at 724-25 (noting competence and extraordinary powers
of Chief Justices over past fifty years); see also State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 901 (N.J. 1997)
(showing Poritz writing opinion in Fifth Amendment Miranda warnings case); Stuart
Taylor Jr., Boy Scouts Should Admit Gays - But Not by Fiat, NAT'L J., Aug. 14, 1999, at
2348 (contending Poritz opinion banning homosexuals from Boy Scouts was bigotry).
29 701 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1997).
30 701 A.2d 1243 (N.J. 1997).
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upheld government policies against challenges based on the
search and seizure provisions of the federal and state
constitutions.31 In J.G. the Court upheld HIV testing of persons
convicted of, indicted for or formally charged with a sexual
offense when the victim requested the test.32 In PBA Local, the
Court approved random drug testing for members of the state's
transit police. 33
In both cases, the Court adopted the "special needs" approach
set out in two 1989 cases by the United States Supreme Court for
analyzing warrantless searches under the Federal Constitution.34
These cases, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association35
and National Treasury Employees Umon v. von Raab,36
established a "balancing test" to determine whether under the
particular facts presented, the government could show a need
"beyond the normal need of law enforcement" sufficient to
overcome the usual requirements of a warrant or individualized
suspicion.37 The New Jersey Court considered this procedure
worth adapting to its own constitutional analysis and found that
the challenged policies were justified by special exceptions from
the general rule that a search without a warrant is per se
unreasonable. In doing so, the Court rejected earlier state
appellate precedent that the state Constitutions did not condone
such an approach.38 Although Chief Justice Poritz explicitly
31 See JG., 701 A.2d at 1274 (holding statutes do not impinge on state and federal
constitutions and uphold governmental practices); PBA Local 304, 701 A.2d at 1260
(holding testing transit officers is constitutional).
32 J G., 701 A.2d at 1274 (noting probable cause must be present to believe there was
possibility victim had been exposed to any HIV transmission).
33 PBA Local, 701 A.2d at 1260 (holding transit officers have less expectation of
privacy and therefore increase in state's interests make random testing constitutional).
34 See PBA Local, 701 A.2d at 1255 (holding special needs test allows court to balance
different factors in order to protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures); see
also JG., 701 A.2d 1266 (holding special needs test must be applied because of federal
precedent).
35 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
36 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
37 See PBA Local, 701 A.2d at 1255 (holding special needs test is flexible in permitting
courts to balance all factors in determining whether search is reasonable under Fourth
Amendment); see also JG., 701 A.2d 1266 (noting balancing approach must be applied
pursuant to federal precedent of Supreme Court).
38 See Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 10 v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d
430, 437 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding random drug testing not permitted
under state constitution); see also State v. Young, 432 A.2d 874, 879 (N.J. 1981) (noting
any warrantless search, without exception, is prima facie invalid). But see N.J. Transit
PBA Local 304 v. N.J. Transit Corp., 701 A.2d 1243 (N.J. 1997), overruled by, State v.
Young, 432 A.2d 874, 879 (N.J. 1981).
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noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court has often expanded
the protections affirmed under its search and seizure provision
beyond those under the federal Constitution, the Court found
that the special needs test provides a useful analytical
framework for considering the protections afforded by Article
I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and adopt this
approach on our review of [the] drug testing program. This
approach enables a court to take into account the complex
factors relevant in each case and to balance those factors in
such [a] manner as to ensure that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is adequately
protected.39
Poritz went on to find in J G. that the State's interest in
respecting the rights of victims, and in PBA Local in promoting
safety in the operation of New Jersey Transit's operations, each
presented "special needs" sufficient to overcome the prima facie
unconstitutionality of a warrantless search.40
The final decision arising out of Poritz' first term, State v.
pZ,41 evoked dissents from Justices Coleman and Pollock. The
Court held that a Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS)
officer was not required to issue "Miranda warnings to a parent
prior to a non-custodial interview related to a child abuse
investigation."42 The defendant made an inculpatory statement
during the interview, which was reported by the DYFS officer to
the prosecutor. The Court found that the circumstances of the
interview did not amount to a custodial situation sufficient to
trigger Miranda.43 Justice Pollock dissented, noting that the
prosecutor had requested the DYFS officer to report the results of
39 PBA Local, 701 A.2d at 1255-56.
40 See PBA Local, 701 A.2d at 1255 (noting this is first time court has deemed special
needs test to apply although test has been recognized in past); see also JG., 701 A.2d at
1266 (holding search reasonable after applying special needs test).
41 703 A.2d 901 (N.J. 1997).
42 Id. at 904 (holding there is no basis to require Miranda warnings be issued by
caseworkers).
43 See State v. P.Z, 703 A.2d at 918-19 (finding no basis to require DYFS caseworkers
to give Miranda warnings or afford right to counsel during non-coercive, non-custodial
interviews of parents subject to Title Nine investigations); see also G.S. v. Dep't of Human
Servs., 723 A.2d 612, 621 (N.J. 1999) (noting State's parens patriae power to protect
children from acts negatively impacting upon them); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d
55, 151-152 (N.J. 1999) (stating Miranda requirement is triggered by "custodial
interrogation").
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the conversation and that both the DYFS officer and the
prosecutor knew the defendant was represented by counsel at the
time of the interview. 44 These decisions led some observers to
conclude that the Court was beginning to shift to the right and
that its decisions were beginning to reflect lesser protections of
individual rights.
In keeping with the Chiefs prerogative, Poritz reserved some
of the more controversial and significant decisions for herself. In
her first terms, she authored major opinions in Planned
Parenthood v. Farmer,45 which struck down an abortion parental
notification bill on the basis of the state Constitution; In re
Proportionality Review Project 1146 which generally upheld the
proportionality review processes enacted to ensure fairness in
death penalty cases; Abbott v. Burke 147 which was concerned
primarily with aspects of the Department of Education's
proposals to implement the Court's earlier Abbott decisions at
the preschool level; and Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,48 which
declared the Boy Scouts' anti-homosexual policy a violation of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Two of these decisions,
Dale and Abbott, were issued without dissent, although the
United States Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Court in
Dale. In this regard, at least, Poritz has been able to maintain
the unity of the Court in major cases, which was long a hallmark
of New Jersey's tradition of a strong Chief Justice.49
Justice Virginia Long was confirmed in July of 1999 to replace
Justice Alan B. Handler. At the time of her appointment, Justice
Long was a well-regarded member of the appellate bench, and
her nomination raised little difficulty. In her first term (1999-
2000), she wrote seven opinions, and twelve the following term.50
44 See State v. P.Z, 703 A.2d at 919 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (arguing to allow
introduction of defendant's uncounseled inculpatory statement made to DYFS caseworker
would be "fundamentally unfair"); see also In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. 1987)
(holding Fifth Amendment protected parents from court order compelling them to
incriminate themselves as condition precedent to obtaining custody of their children); Doe
v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 421 (N.J. 1995) (explaining New Jersey's doctrine of fundamental
fairness "serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental
action. ..).
45 762 A.2d 620, 639 (N.J. 2000).
46 757 A.2d 168, 179 (N.J. 2000).
47 748 A.2d 82, 84-85 (N.J. 2000).
48 734 A.2d 1196, 1225 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
49 Wefmg, supra note 8, at 727.
50 Administrative Office of the Courts, Opinion Reports (on file with editors).
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Her dissents in capital cases appear to have staked out a position
for Long on the left of the Court, a place formerly filled by Justice
Handler. In In re Proportionality Review, 51 for example, she
dissented from the Court's requirement that a defendant present
"relentless documentation"52 that race influenced the death
sentence, concluding instead that the requirement appeared "out
of the blue" and was without basis in "law or reason."53 Long's
progressive inclination is even more evident in VC v. M.L.B., for
which she wrote both the majority opinion and a separate
concurrence. VC concerned "what legal standard applies to a
third party's claim to joint custody and visitation of her former
domestic partner's biological children, with whom she lived in a
familial setting and in respect to whom she claimed to have
functioned as a psychological parent."54 The Court's majority
opinion set out standards of "psychological parenthood"
applicable to both straight and gay couples. The Court evoked its
parens patriae powers to protect the interests of the children,
which included an assessment of whether the third party had
assumed the functions of a parent, separation from whom would
harm the child.55 However, in her separate concurrence Long
elaborates on a progressive view of family life, stating that "the
values attached to family life.., can exist in [other] settings
[than the nuclear family], including families created by
unmarried couples regardless of their sexual orientation."56 Long
51 757 A.2d 168, 179-184 (N.J. 2000) (Long, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 233 (Long, J., dissenting) (urging court to abandon "relentless
documentation" by adopting less burdensome quantum of proof as standard defendant
must meet in proving "substantial discriminatory effect"). See State v. Martini, 734 A.2d
257, 272 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting racial discrimination claim for lack of "relentless
documentation"); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1059 (N.J. 1992) (focusing on risk
defendants will be sentenced to death either because of their race or victim's race).
53 See 757 A.2d at 181 (Long, J., dissenting) (stating "tihen last term, out of the blue,
we adopted the 'relentless documentation' standard.") (citation omitted); see also State v.
Chew, 731 A.2d 1070, 1090-1092 (N.J. 1999) (citing as controlling precedent court's
rejection of racial discrimination claim for lack of relentless documentation), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1052 (1999); State v. Harvey, 731 A.2d 1121, 1143 (N.J. 1999) (stating same). In
State v. Koskovich, 776 A.2d 144 (N.J. 2001), which produced six separate opinions, Long
contended that the Court should review the constitutionality of the death penalty
altogether.
54 See V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42 (N.J. 2000) (holding that biological
mother's former partner was her children's psychological parent and was thus entitled to
visitation rights).
55 See id. at 549 (stating that Court may intervene under exceptional circumstances
under its parenspatriae powers to protect welfare of children).
56 Id. at 557-58 (O'Hern, Long, J.J., concurring). While O'Hern, J., wrote the
concurring opinion, Long, J., was in agreement with its substance.
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identified a number of factors that she said should be considered
as defining a family rather than the exclusive equivalence of
family with the "nuclear" family.5 7
Of the recent appointees, Peter Verniero, who, like Poritz was
serving as Attorney General at the time of appointment, has
caused the most controversy. Despite working in both the
private and public sectors, and having clerked for the well-
respected retired Justice Robert Clifford, he was not considered
to be experienced enough to fill the place of Justice Pollock.
Indeed, a committee of the state bar association refused to
qualify him for the post, an action that caused Governor
Whitman to bypass the association's approval in her subsequent
appointments to the Court.58  In his first term, however,
Verniero, perhaps trying to overcome the image of him that was
generated by his nomination process, authored ten opinions. He
also dissented from the Court in two cases. The following term
showed an increased output, with twelve majority opinions. 59
Justice Jaynee LaVecchia was nominated in December 1999, to
replace Justice Marie Garibaldi. LaVecchia was serving as the
Commissioner for Banking and Insurance at the time of her
appointment. Prior to that position, LaVecchia served as Chief
Administrative Law Judge for five years, where she gained a
reputation for "meticulous" opinions. 60 In her first term, she was
quite prolific, authoring five opinions in the few months left of
the Court term in which she was able to take part. LaVecchia
authored Crews v. Crews,6 1 where the Court held unanimously to
allow a motion by a divorced wife to reconsider the alimony
payments allowed in her divorce. The Court, affirming its earlier
decision in Lepis v. Lepi, 62 held that the standard for
57 See id. at 557 (O'Hern, Long, J.J., concurring) (stating that bond which develops in
family "is borne out of the daily toil parents engage in to keep their children healthy and
safe from harm; out of the love and attention provided to the children; and out of the
unconditional regard returned by the children to the parental figures").
58 See Michael Booth & Tim O'Brien, Verniero Review Fractures Bar, Tests Compact
156 N.J.L.J. 169 (1999).
59 Administrative Office of the Courts, Opinion Reports (on file with editors).
60 See Wendy Davis, La Vecchia as AL: Meticulous Fact Finder with a Sympathetic
Ear, 159 N.J.L.J. 93, (2000).
61 751 A.2d 524, 531-33 (N.J. 2000) (setting forth standards for use by trial courts in
determining whether modification of alimony payments is warranted because of changed
circumstances).
62 416 A.2d 45, 47 & 51 (N.J. 1980) (holding that supporting spouse's alimony
payments depends mainly on quality of life achieved during marriage).
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determining or modifying a proper alimony payment, which
should be determined at the time of the divorce, is whether "the
supported spouse can maintain a lifestyle reasonably comparable
to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." This
determination should initially be made at the time of divorce, if
not, a modified alimony award is appropriate.
In May 2000, Justice Daniel J. O'Hern retired and was
replaced by James Zazzali, the most recent appointee to the
Court. He is still largely a judicial unknown. He worked with
both Democrats and Republicans in his long career in New
Jersey legal and political positions, and is generally considered a
moderate. He served as prosecutor for Essex County and as
Governor Brendan Byrne's Attorney General. In private
practice, he became well known as a labor lawyer and appellate
advocate.
A SURVEY OF RECENT CASES
To determine whether any recognizable shift has occurred in
the Court's jurisprudence or in its perception of its role in the
state's constitutional structure, this paper shall concentrate on a
selection of cases from the following areas: (1) intra-state
relations and state-federal relations, what have been called
"horizontal" and "vertical" federalisms; (2) the elaboration of
individual rights; and (3) rights of plaintiffs. While constituting
only a portion of the Court's docket, the issues that these cases
consistently raise may provide a glimpse as to the change, if any,
in the Court's reasoning. 63
In each instance, drawing upon the Court's own precedent, we
can chart a rough ideological direction. In category (1), we would
expect a liberal or progressive Court to favor the state over the
locality, and the nation over the state; in category (2), we would
expect a progressive Court to expand individual rights based on
its state Constitution beyond those available under the federal
Constitution; and in (3), we would expect a progressive Court to
protect and extend the rights of plaintiffs in litigation, including,
in the employment context, to enforce the plaintiffs rights in
63 See Folster, supra note 21, at 1503-04 (reviewing different set of cases involving
death penalty, Megan's law, freedom of expression, hate crime legislation, mandatory HIV
testing of sex offenders, and random employee drug testing).
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order to vindicate public benefits.
Federalism.
As long ago as 1973, the Court, in the first Robinson v. Cahill
decision, warned that federalism and separation of powers
arguments that may have a place in federal litigation have a
lesser, if any, role to play in a state Supreme Court's analysis.
"The question whether the equal protection demand of our State
Constitution is offended remains for us to decide. Conceivably a
State Constitution could be more demanding. For one thing,
there is absent the principle of federalism which cautions against
too expansive a view of a federal constitutional limitation upon
the power and opportunity of the several States to cope with
their own problems in the light of their own circumstances."64
The frequent recourse to state supreme courts for more directly
"day-to-day political issues" necessitates that they become
"interdependent members of state government."65  They are
therefore less likely to engage in the practice of judicial restraint
customary among federal judges. And Tarr has contended that,
despite the strong New Jersey tradition of "home rule" and
attachment to locality, the Court has effected a shift toward a
more state-centered governing and policy system. Indeed, in
reviewing the cases decided from the adoption of the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947 through the 1980s, Tarr and Porter
concluded that "[wlhen conflicts have arisen between the state
and local governments, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
characteristically favored the claims of the state."66 Therefore,
we should expect that over the last five years, in contests
between the state and local governments, the Court will tend to
favor the state. And in contests between the state and federal
government, we should expect the federal government to prevail.
The current Court is composed almost entirely of former state-
64 See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973) (holding New Jersey's local
property taxation scheme for support of public schools unconstitutional because it leads
to great inequities in education).
65 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
RationaLity Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1156 (1999).
66 See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE
AND NATION, 210-11 (Yale University Press 1988) (reviewing New Jersey Supreme Court's
judical activisim since WWII); See also MARY CORNELIA PORTER & G. ALAN TARR, STATE
SUPREME COURTS POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Greenwood Press 1982).
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level officials: Poritz and Verniero served as Attorneys General,
LaVecchia served as a state commissioner, and Stein served as
Governor Byrne's Director of Policy and Planning. Zazzali also
served in a number of executive posts, including a brief stint as
Attorney General. This executive branch presence may preserve
the Court's traditional deference toward that executive branch.67
While there is a line of cases stating that state policies should
take local sensibilities into account, nevertheless the case law
confirms this foregoing hypothesis. 68  For example, for a
unanimous court Justice Zazzali ruled against the Township of
Franklin, which had alleged that defendant-farmers had violated
local land-use ordinances, on the basis of the State Right to Farm
Act.69 While the Court stated that the agencies charged with
applying the Act, the county agricultural boards and the State
Agricultural Development Committee, should consider local land-
use regulations, in Hollander the Court affirmed the Appellate
Division's opinion and stated that such cases in the future would
be fact-specific. The most important of these perhaps will prove
to be In re Charter School Application of Englewood,70 which
upheld state legislation permitting charter schools against an
array of constitutional and statutory challenges by the local
school board. Charter schools, although public, are independent
of the local school board and are managed by a separate board of
trustees.7 1 The creation of these charter schools, as the Court
noted, is a recent innovation and represents a shift away from
the traditionally strong local control over public schools. 72
67 G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Decidedly Co-Equal: The New Jersey Supreme
Court. Center for State Constitutional Studies at http'/www-
camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/papers.htn (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
68 See, e.g., Garden State Farms, Inc., v. Bay, 390 A.2d 1177 (N.J. 1977) (holding
failure to take local land use regulations into account in siting aviation facilities would
constitute an abuse of discretion).
69 Township of Franklin v. Hollander, 2002 WL 1009221 (N.J. May 20, 2002).
70 753 A.2d 687, 689 (N.J. 2000) modifying 744 A.2d 1206 (N.J. 1999) (modifying only
its articulation of Commissioner of Education's responsibilities when reviewing financial
and racial impacts that approval of charter school will have on public school districts).
71 See id. at 319-20 (defining charter schools); see also Kevin S. Hauffman, Note,
Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation and the New School Reform Movement, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1294 (1998) (discussing characteristics of charter schools).
72 See Englewood, 753 A.2d at 689-690 (stating movement toward charter schools
started in 1991). See generally Ronald T. Hyman, State-Operated Local School Districts
in New Jersey, 96 ED. L. REP. 915, 916 (1995) (stating "...[W]ithin any given state,
especially in New Jersey, the term 'local control' always refers to municipal control as
opposed to state control").
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Although the case was decided at an interim time in the
Whitman appointments (two judges were designated from the
appellate bench), all of the present permanent members of the
Court (Poritz, Coleman, Long and LaVecchia) voted for the
charter schools. The Court did impose a generalized obligation
on the state to monitor the racial impact of the charter schools,
but the important issue in Englewood was the preference
expressed by the Court for the state interest over the localities.
The Court stated at the outset of its opinion that "[t]he provision
of public education in New Jersey is a state function," arising
from the state constitutional provision guaranteeing every
student a "thorough and efficient" education.73 The local school
boards were given the burden of demonstrating that the
constitutional provision of a thorough and efficient education
cannot be met.7 4 Stein wrote a brief concurrence to state only
that the Court's opinion did not endorse charter schools as a
policy matter.75
The localities also lost in Board of Chosen Freeholders of
Morris County v. State,76 where the Court unanimously found
that the counties remain responsible for construction and
renovation of judicial facilities, despite the enactment of a new
constitutional amendment shifting some of these costs to the
State. The Court found that the provision (Article VI, Section
VIII para 1) which required that the state assume "certain"
judicial costs, did not include within it a requirement that the
state take on the costs associated with new judicial facilities,
which had been borne by the counties. 77 An uncommon recent
instance of the Court allowing a locality some advantage over the
73 See Englewood, 753 A.2d at 689 (citing N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, p. 1); see also
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 291-292 (N.J. 1973) (holding that obligation to provide
thorough and efficient system of free public schools is state's constitutional
responsibility).
74 See Englewood, 753 A.2d at 691; see also Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d at 291-292
(stating that determination to enlist local school districts to meet obligation is permissible
so long as state ensures that means chosen to deliver educational services fulfills
constitutional obligation).
75 See Englewood, 753 A.2d at 700 (Stein J., concurring in result) (stating ... 1 read
and understand the court's opinion as neither expressing nor implying any view about the
wisdom of that legislative choice").
76 732 A.2d 1053, 1063 (N.J. 1999).
77 See id.; see also N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (defining "judicial costs" as costs incurred
by county for funding judicial system, including but not limited to costs including salaries,
health benefits and pension payments of all judicial employees, juror fees and library
material costs).
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state was in Lacey Municipal Utilities Authority v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection,78 where the Court
allowed a municipality to recover costs from the state-directed
Spill Fund for an environmental clean up. The Court did this
however, only because the regulations governing recovery were
unclear at the time of the suit. Because the state Department of
Environmental Protection, which oversees the Fund, had
amended the relevant regulations during the pendency of the
case, the Court was confident that such a case would not arise in
the future.79
The Supreme Court has, despite its prominence in the New
Federalism debate, generally taken an expansive view in favor of
federal preemption of state law. In Village of Ridgefield Park v.
New York Susquehanna & Western Railway Corp.,80 Stein, for a
four-member majority, upheld the pre-emptive effect of federal
railroad regulations over a municipality's except those having to
do with safety or welfare. 81 R.F. v. Abbott Laboratories82 held
that federal medical regulations pre-empted a state product
liability statute concerning defective design of a blood-testing
device. The majority found that under the "implied preemption"
doctrine, "plaintiffs' state law claim is preempted by the FDA's
unique regulation of the Test based on principles of implied
preemption rather than express preemption under the M[edical]
D[evices] A[ct]."83 Stein and O'Hern dissented on the basis that
.78 See 738 A.2d 955, 956 (N.J. 1999); see also Spill Compensation and Control Act,
N.J. STAT. § 58:10-23.11 (1985) (current version available at N.J. STAT. § 58:10-23.11
(2000)).
79 See Lacey, 738 A.2d at 956-57. See generally Marsh v. N.J. Spill Comp. Fund and
Envtl. Claims Admin., 670 A.2d 67, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (recognizing that
Spill Fund is held strictly liable for cleanup and removal costs arising from forbidden
discharge); N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983)
(understanding that common law and statutory remedies are available in addition to
remedies provided under Spill Act).
0 750 A.2d 57 (N.J. 1986).
81 See Ridgefield, 750 A.2d 57 (asserting that text and structure of Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act indicate that Congress did not intend to establish private
right of action); see also Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1998)
(recognizing that Federal Act expressly preempted state from adding other requirements
to labeling provision). See generally Symposium, The State Role in Telecommunications
Regulation: Models of Cooperative Federalism for Telecommunications, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 71, 74 (1996) (recognizing that preemption ensures compliance, designates
responsibility, and advances negotiations).
82 745 A.2d 1174, 1192 (N.J. 2000) (finding that basis for preemption was implied
rather than expressed).
83 See R.F., 745 A.2d at 1192 (noting that Abbot's test requirements went above and
beyond normal federal requirements that triggered preemption); see also William 0.
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the Court stretched the "implied preemption" doctrine too far,
and its conclusion was not warranted by the facts presented.84
The dissenters disputed the majority's conclusion that the
regulations of a federal agency (here the FDA) were sufficient to
preempt a state law claim without violating the Supremacy
Clause. 85 R.F. and Ridgefield continue a theme already present
in the Poritz Court. In Turner v. F-rst Union National Bank,86
for example, Justice Garibaldi, writing for the Court, held that
federal banking regulations pre-empted a state statute
concerning legal representation fees in mortgage transactions. 87
And more recently, in Housing Authority & Urban
Redevelopment Agency ofAtlantic City v. Taylor, the Court in an
opinion written by Justice Zazzali, reversed a decision in favor of
the state housing authority seeking attorney's fees from a tenant
on the grounds that federal law prohibited low-income tenants
Fabbri, Home HIV Testing and Conflicts with State HIV Testing Regulations, 21 AM. J.L.
& MED. 419, 434 (1995) (observing that state law will be preempted if FDA has instituted
regulation or requirement applicable to medical device). See generally Kenneth T.
Sigman, Note, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Bad Medicine for Manufacturers of Unproven
Medical Devices, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 724 (1998) (stating that 1976 Amendments to
Medical Device Act preempted area traditionally left to states).
84 See R.F, 745 A.2d at 1198 (Stein, J., dissenting) (claiming that understatement of
materiality and exaggeration of preemption analysis caused justice to dissent). See
generally Dan L. Burk, The Milk Free Zone: Federal and Local Interests in Regulating
Recombinant, 22 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 227, 249 (1997) (finding that state law is not
preempted if it can operate independently from federal law); Marcia Coyle, Business Tort
Shield Comes Under High Court Review, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, 2000, at 4
(discussing that preemption of state law under Medical Devices Act can be devastating for
plaintiffs because there is no private cause of action under federal law).
85 See R.F, 745 A.2d at 1205-06 (Stein, J., dissenting) (asserting that federal-state
balance of Supremacy Clause would be disturbed if federal agency could come in at any
time and decide that its regulations are exclusive). See generally Burk, supra note 84, at
249 (discussing that preemption is matter of congressional intent, looking first for
expressed statements and then for implied); Common-Law Claims Are Not Expressly
Preempted by Consumer Product Safety Act; Colon v. BIC USA, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28,
2000, at 21 (noting that Supremacy Clause states that U.S. laws are "supreme law" and
that federal law preempts state law when Congress expressly provides, when federal
regulation removes entire field from state control, and when state law directly conflicts
federal law).
86 740 A.2d 1081, 1083 (N.J. 1999) (finding that issue before court concerned
interpretation of statute regarding mortgage transactions).
87 See id. at 1090-91 (stating that statute specifically allows attorney's fees to be
charged to borrowers as long as services provided by attorney concern loan); see also
Geoffrey M. Connor, Banking Law How to be a Predatory Lender and How Banks Can
Begin to Put an End to the Practice, N.J.L.J., Sept. 4, 2000 (discussing how Alternative
Mortgage Transactions Parity Act could preempt state laws when nondepository state-
licensed lenders made "alternative mortgage transactions"). But see Bd. of Tr. of
Operating Eng'r Local 825 Fund Svc. Facilities v. L.B.S. Constr. Co., 691 A.2d 339, 347
(N.J. 1997) (finding action to recover unpaid pension benefits from bonds issued under
state public works bond act not preempted by ERISA).
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from paying such fees. 88
Individual Rgh ts
In developing the "New Judicial Federalism," the various state
courts have elaborated different approaches to whether their
state constitutions allowed a greater protection or expansion of
individual rights than the federal constitutions.8 9 The New
Jersey Supreme Court has been well known in this debate for
having adopted a "supplemental" approach to assessing rights
claims under its state Constitution.90  This approach, first
discussed in a concurring opinion by Handler in State v. Hunt,91
was formally adopted by the Court a year later in State v.
Williams. 92  The approach sets out a series of criteria for
considering whether to follow or depart from federal
constitutional holdings. These criteria are: (1) the textual
language of the two constitutions; (2) the legislative history of the
state constitution; (3) the preexisting state law; (4) the structural
difference between the constitutions; (5) whether the contested
issues involve a matter of particular state interest or local
88 2002 WL 264181 (N.J. Feb. 26, 2002).
89 See Peter J. Galie, Constitutional Politics in the States: Contemporary
Controversies and Historical Patterns, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV'T, Mar. 22, 1997, at 37
(noting that in last twenty years ideological change on U.S. Supreme Court is one
favoring recognition of rights protection in state constitutions); Andrew S. Winter, Raven
Revisited: Do Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to Possess Marijuana in the
Privacy of Their Homes?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 315, 322 (1998) (observing that "New
Judicial Federalism" is liberal use of state constitution). See generally Rachel A. Van
Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV. 199, 207-
19 (1998) (reviewing several approaches taken by state supreme courts).
90 See Tarr & Porter, supra note 7, at 207-208 (stating difficulty in determining
whether or not court will act on state constitution); see also Kathleen Brady, Search and
Seizure; Court Refuses to Adopt Labron, Exigent -Circumstances Finding Vital to NJ.
Warrant Exception, N.J.L.J., May 29, 2000, at 19 (recognizing that New Jersey's state
constitution is commonly interpreted to allow for greater protection of rights than federal
counterpart); E.E. Mazier, Statute Enhancing Penalty for Harassment Motivated by Bias
Withstands Constitutional Attack, N.J.L.J., June 13, 1994, at 16 (noting that New Jersey
Supreme Court usually turns to state constitution in attempt to provide its citizens
broader protection of certain rights).
91 450 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. 1982) (understanding that role of state constitution is to act
as second level of defense for rights protected under U.S Constitution).
92 See 459 A.2d 641, 650 (N.J. 1983) (recognizing individual rights under state
constitution when state's constitutional history, public policy, legal traditions warrant
such action); see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 927 (N.J. 1982) (considering
Due Process claim under New Jersey's constitution as independent source of rights). See
e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 625 (N.J. 1980) (acknowledging state constitution as
alternative basis for determining public's right of access to pre-trial stage of criminal
prosecution).
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concern; (6) state traditions and history; and (7) the public
attitude of the state's citizenry. 93 Justice Pollock described this
approach as providing that "a court looks first to the federal
constitution when deciding whether state action is valid. If,
however, the status of the litigant's rights are questionable under
the United States Constitution, or if the asserted violation of
rights is found valid under that document, then a court consults
the state constitution."94
The Court has used this approach to carve out, where
necessary, greater protections for individual rights than those
afforded under federal precedents. It has not been whole-
heartedly accepted, however, even by the New Jersey Justices
themselves. Justice O'Hern, for example, stated a reluctance to
interpret state guarantees as greater than federal because of
"(1)... a deeper respect for the Constitution of the United States
and the Supreme Court of the United States, and (2) because of a
pragmatic concern that the reservoirs of the state constitution
may be drained by over consumption." 95 Even in Hunt itself,
Justice Pashman noted that under the "criteria" approach "a
state court is compelled to the [United States] Supreme Court's
decision, and to explain, in terms of the identified criteria, why it
is not following the Supreme Court precedent," which seems to
detract from the independence of the state constitutional
analysis. 96 Some scholars have also noted the weaknesses in
93 See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 962, 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring) (discussing criteria to
determine when to invoke state constitution as independent source of protection of
individual rights); see also State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 300 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that not fully interpreting state constitution "arrests the progress we
have made in expounding our constitution"). See generally State v. Stever, 527 A.2d 408,
415 (N.J. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 954 (1987) (noting that state constitution and laws
may provide greater protection than federal counterparts).
94 See Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of
Balancing the Relationship between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REV. 977, 984
(1985) (describing supplementary approach to assessing claims under state constitution);
see also Robert F. Utter, Swimmingin the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1028 (1985) (inquiring whether state constitution offers means of
supplanting federal rights); Van Cleave, supra, note 89, at 209-10 (discussing
supplemental interpretation).
95 See O'Hern, supra note 10, at 828 (noting reluctance to follow trend allowing more
protections in state constitution than Supreme Court finds in federal Constitution); see
also Marie L. Garibaldi, The Rehnquist Court and State Constitutional Law, 34 TULSA
L.J. 67, 73-76 n.91-97 (1998) (discussing "supplemental" or "criteria" approach and noting
differences among Justices). See generallyFolster, supra note 21, at 1542-43 (examining
decisions of Justices Handler, O'Hern and Pollack).
96 See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 960 & 960n.1 (Pashman, J., concurring) (disagreeing with
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limiting the unique discourse of state constitutional theory to a
limited set of criteria.97
Despite some reservation, however, the Court has continued to
employ the supplemental approach. In Dale and VC. the Court
continued to expand its notion of rights under the state
Constitution. The only partial retreat perhaps is where the
search and seizure protections run into compelling state policies,
as in J G. and PBA Local, decided in light of recent Supreme
Court precedent.
The Court's commitment to the "supplemental" approach of
state constitutional interpretation was apparent in the Farmer
case, which strongly disputed the state's reasons that the
parental notification act overcame the interests of minors. In
Farmer, Poritz stated that "we have not hesitated to read [the
state Constitution] to provide greater rights than its federal
counterpart" and held for the Court that the protections of Article
1, section 7 of the state Constitution provided fuller privacy
protections than the federal Constitution. Justices O'Hern and
Verniero dissented in separate opinions on the basis that there
was insufficient evidence of undue burden to overturn the
statute.98
In New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
majority's analysis of when divergent state and federal interests are appropriate); see also
Garibaldi, supra note 95, at 73-75 (1998) (quoting Rehnquist, "I do not think the [United
States Supreme] Court is necessarily the final arbiter of the law of the land. It is the final
arbiter of the U.S. Constitution and of the meaning of Federal statutes and treaties. .. ).
See generally Brennan supra note 2, at 503-504 (citing benefit of double source of
protection).
97 See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1044-45 (1997) (analyzing New Jersey state
court interpretations of criteria application vis-a-vis application of state constitution); see
also Edmund B. Spaeth, Toward A New Partnership: The Future Relationship of Federal
and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 729, 741 (1988) (comparing Justice
Brennan and Judge Linde's approaches to resolving relationship of state and federal
constitutional law). Compare James W. Talbot, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the
Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1099, 1100-1103 (1991) (exploring
difference between Washington State Constitution and Federal Constitution).
98 Compare Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 643 (2000)
(holding state interest in enforcing statutory classification does not outweigh woman's
fundamental rights and is unconstitutional under equal protection clause of New Jersey
Constitution), with Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894-901,
(1992) (holding Pennsylvania abortion legislation constitutional, except for spousal notice
provisions, under Fourteenth Amendment due process clause of United States
Constitution). See generally Kevin Francis O'Neill, The Road Not Taken: State
Constitutions as an Alternative Source of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 5, 28 (1993) (noting that state constitutions are neglected by lawyers
advancing cause of reproductive freedom).
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JMB. Realty,99 the Court, through a majority opinion by
Wilentz, expanded free speech rights beyond those in the federal
Constitution and allowed leaf letters into a privately owned
shopping mall. JMB was an influential decision, and a number
of other states courts have adopted its reasoning.lOO This past
term, in Green Party of New Jersey v. Hartz Mountain
Industries, Ine.,01 the Court was offered the opportunity to
reassess or limit the extent of its holding in JAIB. The case
involved a shopping mall that imposed a series of conditions on
groups seeking to petition or pass out leaflets inside the mall,
including the posting of a $1 million insurance policy, a "hold
harmless" agreement and restricting access to a certain number
of days. 0 2 Justice O'Hern, opining for the Court, strongly
affirmed JMB and held that a mall could not impose those
conditions under the state constitution, at least not unless such
requirements, after sufficient fact-finding could be "related to the
actual activities" proposed by the leaf letters.103 The Hartz
opinion lays out in great detail the New Jersey courts' long
commitment to free speech rights,104 which have been "at the
99 650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied sub nom Short Hills Assocs. V. N.J.
Coalition Against War in the Middle East, 516 U.S. 812 (1995) (holding right of free
speech in New Jersey state constitution requires regional shopping centers to permit
distribution of leaflets subject to reasonable conditions); cf William G. Mulligan, Found.
for the Control of First Aid Squadders and Roving Paramedics v. Brooks, 711 A.2d 961,
963-65 (N.J. 1998) (finding no violation of state constitutional right of free speech). See
generally Stanley Mosk, Brennan Lecture: States'Rigbts- And Wrongs, 72 N.Y.U.L. REV.
552, 564n.86 (1997) (discussing authority of state to exercise right to adopt more
expansive constitutional liberties than federal Constitution provides).
100 See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Private Property, Public Property. Shopping Centers
and Expressive Freedom in the States, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1229, 1254-58 (1999) (discussing
free speech rights under federal and state constitutions); see also Thomas P. Leff, The
Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free Expression? First Amendment Implications of
Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 AM. U.L. REV.
353, 375-76 n.139 (1995) (comparing individual's right to free speech in private and public
forums); cf United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736-37 (1990) (re-affirming protection
of free speech in traditional public forum).
10 752 A.2d 315 (N.J. 2000).
102 Id. at 317.
103 Id. at 332.
104 See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (stating right to free speech under
New Jersey Constitution guards against unreasonable or oppressive conduct of both
government and private parties); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (holding
although employer of migrant farm workers may reasonably require those visiting his
employees to identify themselves, employer may not deny worker his privacy or interfere
with his opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy associations customary among all
citizens); see also Richard T. Pfohl, Note, Hague v. CIO and the Roots of Pubh'c Forum
Doctrine: Translating Limits ofPowers into Individual Rights, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
533 (1993) (discussing Hague v. CIO decision and New Jersey's historical placement at
center of debate over speech and assembly).
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historical center of debate over speech and assembly," and the
changing demographics that persuaded the Court to treat
shopping malls as the "new main street." 05
Hartz preserves the Court's traditional heightened protection
of political speech, as well as its inclination to adapt traditional
analyses (such as the public forum doctrine) to changed
circumstances. In Townsi'p of Pennsauken v. Schad,106 the
Court determined that a municipality's ordinances regarding
sign size and location did not violate the rights of the owner of an
adult bookstore. The reasoning of the case (written by Handler)
reflects a great deal of deference to the wishes of the local zoning
boards in regulating business in general, and adult businesses in
particular.107 For example, the Court relied extensively on the
interpretive principle that zoning regulations ought to be
interpreted liberally in favor of the municipality, and conform to
a "common sense understanding of the statutory language."108
However, seven months earlier, in Township of Saddlebrook v.
A.B. Family Center, Ine.,109 a unanimous Court found that a
township could not enforce a state statute that would effectively
bar an adult bookstore from operating at all, but remanded to the
trial court for further findings.110 The Court determined that the
effect of such a statute could not be restricted only to a
municipality's geographic boundaries, but that there must be
"alternative channels of communication within the relevant
market area."111
105 See Hartz, 752 A.2d 315, 321-24 (N.J. 2000) (stating "regional and community
shopping centers have achieved their goal: they have become today's downtown and to
some extent their own community."); see also Mark C. Alexander, Attention Shoppers:
The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1999)
(noting ever-expanding importance of shopping malls in modem American society and
discussing scope of constitutional rights to engage in expressive activity in such privately-
owned places); Maurice F. Kirchofer, Note, New Jersey State Constitution Requires
Privately Owned Shopping Malls to Allow Access for Expressional Leafletting, Subject to
the Owner's Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, 27 SETON HALL L. REV.
289, 304 (1996) (examining societal phenomenon of city to suburb migration and
replacement of downtown commercial and social activity hubs with modern shopping
mall).
106 733 A.2d 1159 (N.J. 1999).
107 Id. at 1168-71.
108 Id. at 1166.
109 722 A.2d 530 (N.J. 1999).
110 Id. at536.
III Id. at 536. But see Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191 (2001) (holding
state statute barring adult business could be enforced).
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Plaintiffs' Rights
Glick reminds us that it is in the nuts-and-bolts of state
practice and procedure that state courts have the most influence
and decide the greatest number of cases, rather than merely the
major constitutional or legal issues of the day.11 2 The New
Jersey Supreme Court has long been a leader in developing new
legal doctrines to deal with changing circumstances. Forty years
ago, in Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,113 the Court
eliminated the doctrine of privity in product liability cases,11 4
which expanded the ability of plaintiffs to recover in tort.
However, over the last five years some have thought that a
shift toward limiting these types of innovations has become
evident in the Court's approach. On this view, the Court has
moved away from accepting new theories of liability, while
continuing to affirm decisions based upon precedent that already
granted broader theories.115  Perhaps the most dramatic
exception to this perceived general trend was F G. v.
MacDonnell. 1 6 In a 5-2 opinion written by Justice Pollock, the
Court affirmed the Appellate Division in part and reversed in
part, and remanded.117 The Court held that F.G. could pursue a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty against MacDonell.11 8 F.G.
could also proceed against Harper, another defendant, if on
112 Glick, in John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson, ed. The American Courts: A Critical
Assessment 95 (1991).
113 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
114 Privity of contract rules maintain that manufacturers or sellers of products
alleged to have caused injury cannot be held liable on the ground of negligence to one with
whom they are not in privity of contract. Origins of this doctrine are found in
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees & W. 109 (1842). See Cox v. Laws, 145 So.2d 703 (Miss.
1962) (honoring former opinions of Mississippi courts requiring privity of contract as
prerequisite to negligence cause of action); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409 (Wash.
1932) (recognizing impact of commercial practices in place at time on "strait jacket of
privity").
115 See Taylor v. Cutler, 724 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1999) (exemplifying New Jersey Supreme
Court's reluctance to broaden boundaries of tort law with its failure to create cause of
action for preconception tort); Alloway v. Bradlees Inc., 723 A.2d 960 (N.J. 1999)
(expressing court's fidelity to precedents in area of construction site negligence and
holding fast to broad recovery right against responsible tortfeasors); see also Ronald B.
Grayzel, Liberal Currents Ebb: Court Declines to Create Tort for Preconception
Negligence But Reairms Commitment to Other Expansive Liability Theories, N.J.L.J.,
Sept. 6, 1999, at S-4 (asserting that Poritz court is "not searching for opportunities to
explode out of the gate to blaze new frontiers").
116 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997).
117 Id. at 705.
118 Id. at 703 (asserting "fiduciary duty essentially requires proof that a parishioner
trusted and sought counseling from the pastor").
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remand the trial court found that such an action would not result
in entanglement with church doctrine.119 The majority framed
the issue as whether "the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution shields a member of the clergy from a claim of
inappropriate sexual conduct with a parishioner who has
consulted the member of clergy for pastoral counseling.' 20 The
Court canvassed cases from other jurisdictions that have allowed
claims on the basis of a fiduciary duty between clergy and
parishioner for certain types of torts. No court, however, has
recognized a separate clergy malpractice claim,121 because of a
hesitation to become entangled in religious teaching or to judge
clergy by secular standards of care. The Court found the breach
of fiduciary duty cases persuasive, and held that pastoral
counseling creates a fiduciary relationship. "By accepting a
parishioner for counseling, a pastor also accepts the
responsibility of a fiduciary."122 Like psychotherapists and their
patients, pastoral counselors may be liable for breaches of
fiduciary duty toward their parishioners. 2 3  The First
Amendment, therefore, does not protect a cleric from a breach a
duty claim when the cleric's actions arise in the context of a
counseling relationship. "[T]he record supports the inference
that MacDonell's alleged misconduct was not an expression of a
sincerely held religious belief, but was an egregious violation" of
his duty toward the plaintiff.124 The Court recognized deposition
testimony presented to the trial court from Episcopal church
officials that affairs between married priests and parishioners
contravene church doctrine, which the defendants did not
119 Id. at 704 (concluding "courts can adjudicate F.G.'s claim for breach of fiduciary
duty without becoming entangled in the defendants' free exercise of their religion").
120 Id. at 701.
121 Id. at 703 (noting "Appellate Division acknowledged that F.G.'s claim presented an
issue of first impression in New Jersey, and that no other court in the United States had
yet recognized a clergy-malpractice claim").
122 Id. at 703.
123 Id. at 705 (stating that "pastoral counselors, like psychotherapists... may be
liable for breach of a fiduciary relationship with a parishioner").
124 Id. at 702 (recalling testimony of church officials that church doctrine does not
sanction sexual conduct by rectors). But see Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn, 705 N.Y.S. 2d 661, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (stating that there is no real
distinction between clergy malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty). See generally N.H.
v. Presbyterian Church, 1999 OK 88, 26 n.47 (Okla. 1999) (noting split in authority
concerning First Amendment and ministerial officers); Scott Idleman, Tort Liabiity,
Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 232-33
(2000) (discussing problems that arise in defining standard for clergy malpractice).
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dispute. The Court did not address how trial courts would
determine whether the cleric's actions arose from sincerely held
religious beliefs. Justice O'Hern dissented in an opinion joined
by Justice Garibaldi. The dissenters concluded that the majority
misunderstood the issue. The defendant clergy were not alleging
that their conduct was excusable because immunized by the First
Amendment; "rather, F.G. asserts that the conduct is tortious
because the defendant is a religious."125 According to O'Hern and
Garibaldi, the basis of the plaintiffs case was that MacDonell
breached a duty of pastoral care towards her. Exploration of that
duty necessitates an examination of clerical religious duties. As
there is no general duty for other types of fiduciaries to refrain
from voluntary sexual relationships with their adult clients, the
imposition of liability here rests solely upon the defendant's
status. Indeed, the dissent interpreted the majority opinion as
holding that "but for MacDonell's status as a clergyman, his
conduct was unrelated to religious doctrine."126 The dissent
closed by stating:
[t]he First Amendment offers no defense to sexual crimes or
abuse [but] no principle of general civil law makes it a tort
for competent adults to engage in consensual sexual
conduct.... Whatever we may think of the morality of the
acts involved, a breach of the tenets of the Episcopal
religion .. does not give rise to a tort action.127
125 See MacDonell, 696 A.2d at 706 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (noting majority rationale
misses constitutional point entirely). But see H.R.B. v. Archbishop Justin Rigali, 913
S.W.2d 92, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (stating religion was not merely incidental to plaintiff-
defendant relationship and First Amendment precludes secular courts to judge sectarian
matters). See generally Idleman, supra note 124, at 232 (explaining clergy malpractice
cause of action requires determination of reasonable clergy standard and reeks of
unconstitutional standard).
126 See MacDonell, 696 A.2d at 706 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (summarizing plaintiffs
argument that "but for" MacDonnell's status as clergyman, no secular law would make his
extramarital affair tort or crime); see also Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (stating that intentional tort by cleric may be actionable even if conduct which
caused harm was related to exercise of religious belief). See generally Dausch v. Rykse, 52
F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing cause of action for fiduciary duty as elliptical
way to state clergy malpractice and therefore not recognized).
127 See Maclonel, 696 A.2d at 709 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see also DeVries v.
Habitat for Humanity, 689 A.2d 142, 142 (N.J. 1997) (holding injured volunteer could sue
charity because volunteer did not receive psychological benefit for performing volunteer
work for purposes of being "beneficiary" of charity under statute granting charities
immunity from suit from injury to "beneficiaries"). See generally Idleman, supra note 124,
at 232 (noting every jurisdiction presented with opportunity to enforce clergy malpractice
has declined).
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However, limits to the Court's expansive views were beginning
to appear. In a unanimous 1998 opinion by Poritz, the Court
determined in Baxt v. LiLoia28 that a plaintiff could not bring a
cause of action based solely on an alleged violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct governing attorney behavior. While
violations of the Rules could assist in measuring the proper
standard of care, they were "not designed to establish standards
for civil liability.'129 The Court rejected the argument that such
a cause of action was necessary to ensure attorney compliance
with the Rules, relying instead on the profession and the court's
role in disciplining the profession. In 1999, in Taylor v. Cutler,130
the Court summarily affirmed without opinion an appellate
court's denial of a claim for "preconception negligence.' 3 1 This
decision was confirmed in part by Lynch v. Scheininger,132 which
allowed plaintiffs to proceed on a claim of medical malpractice
resulting in preconception negligence but held that the decision
to have another child in the face of knowledge of the risk
constituted a supervening cause and therefore would bar such a
claim.133 In Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp.,134 Justice LaVecchia, in an
extensive opinion dealing with the Efficient Market Hypothesis
of economic theory, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
"fraud on the market" theory to demonstrate reliance should be
adopted in common law fraud claims.135
Nor has the Court declined to extend its own authority where a
plaintiff might otherwise be precluded from vindicating her
rights. In Blakey v. Continental Airlines,136 the plaintiff sued
128 714 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 1998) (stating violation of Model Rule should not give rise
to cause of action nor create presumption of breach of legal duty).
129 Id. at 275 (noting further that purpose of Model Rule are subverted when invoked
as procedural weapons). See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 337-38 (1998) (discussing whether disciplinary violation should be
deemed violation of lawyers duty of care). But see Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) ("The Code of Professional Responsibility is a standard of practice
for attorneys which expresses in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, the legal system, and the legal
profession.").
130 724 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1999).
131 See Taylor, 724 A.2d at 793.
132 744 A.2d 113 (N.J. 2000).
133 Id. at 113.
134 754 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 2000).
135 Id. at 1188 (noting proof on market theory is not equivalent of proof of indirect
reliance required in common-law fraud action).
136 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
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several of her co-employees as well as her employer for allegedly
defamatory comments published on a computer bulletin board.137
The defendant-employer knew of the bulletin board and
facilitated employees' use of it, but had no direct control over its
content. The Court found that it had jurisdiction over both the
co-employees and the employer.138 The Court remanded for
further factual findings as to whether the bulletin board's
operation was sufficiently related to the employer's business as to
create liability for comments placed on it. With regard to the
individual employee-defendants, the Court found jurisdiction
using traditional principles of due process, finding "minimum
contacts" but remanding as to whether assertion of jurisdiction
would violate "traditional principles of fair play and substantial
justice."139
In two cases, decided one week apart, the Court allowed one
plaintiff to overcome the statute of limitations in one but not the
other. In the first case, Mancuso v. Nickes,140 the Court, in an
opinion written by O'Hern, ruled that because the plaintiff did
not receive reliable medical advice until after the running of the
statute, she should not be barred from bringing suit. 141 Plaintiff
was diagnosed with a benign tumor; in 1991 a second diagnosis
gave some indication of malignancy, but plaintiffs doctor did not
inform here. It was not until 1996 that plaintiff learned that the
1989 and 1991 incidents may have been negligent. Plaintiff was
137 Id. at 547 (noting plaintiff added defamation to further support claim of hostile
environment); see also Morris v. Oldham, 201 F.3d 784, 788 (61b Cir. 2000) (citing
Supreme Court cases finding vicarious liability to victimized employee for actionable
hostile environment).
138 See Blakey, 751 A.2d at 538-42 (answering affirmatively question whether
employees of Continental Airlines should reasonably expect to be subject to personal
jurisdiction). See generally Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the
Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565 (1999) (discussing jurisdictional problems related to
Internet); John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 979 (1999) (discussing additional factors necessary for
jurisdiction in online context).
139 See Blakey, 751 A.2d at 553-54 (discussing traditional principles of personal
jurisdiction). See generally Leitstein, supra note 138, at 569 (analyzing personal
jurisdiction in relation to growth of Internet); Rothchild, supra note 138, at 979 (noting
additional factors considered when determining personal jurisdiction in online context).
140 747 A.2d 255 (N.J. 2000).
141 See Mancuso, 747 A.2d at 260 (noting Mancuso was reasonably unaware injury
was possibly due to fault of doctor); see also Maertin v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,
2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5857 at *42 (D.N.J. May 3, 2000) (stating not all injuries are easily
discovered). See generally The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations
for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1683 (1983) (discussing statutes of limitation in
relation to toxic torts and difficulty of discovering injury).
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not dilatory and had only acted upon the "nature of information
available" to her at the time.142 The Court stated that the
discovery rule was designed to "avoid harsh results" such as the
one present in those circumstances.143 The other case, Lapka v.
Porter Hayden Co., 1 44 was written by Verniero, with Stein and
O'Hern dissenting. Lapka involved a plaintiff with asbestosis.
The plaintiff was diagnosed with "pleural thickening" and
"pulmonary fibrosis."' 45  When plaintiff filed a workers'
compensation claim, the application indicated that he had been
exposed to "asbestos, noise and other chemicals." Based on those
facts, the Court found that the plaintiff must have known of his
condition when he filed a workers' compensation claim in 1986,
even though a medical diagnosis did not occur until 1996,
specifying his illness as asbestosis. The dissenters characterize
the decision as "exalting literalism over substance," and would
have allowed the claim.1 46
Verniero and O'Hern disagreed again in Rocci v. Ecole
Secondaire MacDonald-Cartier,147 which involved the ability of a
plaintiff to bring a defamation claim against a public school
without alleging actual damages. The Court held that a letter
written about a teacher's behavior by another teacher deserved
First Amendment protection because it involved a matter of
public concern.1 4 8 "In view of that conclusion, we hold that
reutational or pecuniary harm may not be presumed in this case
absent a showing of 'actual malice' as that term is defined in New
142 See id. at 35 (discussing information possessed by patient); see also Molly J.
Liskow, Medical Malpractice; A Patient Reasonably Unaware of Potential Malpractice
Claim Allowed to Use Discovery Rule, N.J. LAWYER, Feb. 28, 2000, at 16 (discussing
nature of information available to plaintiff); Jeffrey L. Loop, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1331,
1333-34 (2000) (discussing Mancuso opinion).
143 747 A.2d 255 (N.J. 2000).
144 745 A.2d 525 (N.J. 2000).
145 Id. at 528 (describing how plaintiff responded in workman's' compensation claim
petition form under "describe extent and character of injury").
146 Id. at 532 (Stein, J., dissenting) (discussing Court's bar of petitioner's product
liability suit for insufficient notice); see also Henry Gottlieb, Asbestos Suit Limitations
Period Starts With Workers' Comp Filing Divided Opinion by Supreme Court is Setback
for Discovery Rule, 159 N.J.L.J. 861 (2000) (indicating dissenting view in Lapka, and how
"reasonable medical support" is basis for plaintiffs notice); Paul B. Matey, Torts -The
Discovery Rule--A Sworn and Signed Workers' Compensation Petition May Impute
Knowledge of a Cause of Action for Occupational Exposure to Asbestos Without a Formal
EvidentiaryHearing-Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1336, 1340-41
(2000) (discussing Stein's dissenting opinion in Lapka).
147 755 A.2d 583 (N.J. 2000).
148 See id. at 584 (indicating court's ruling).
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York T'mes v. Sullivan."149 Because the plaintiff did not allege
any facts supporting such damages, summary judgment for the
defendant was affirmed. O'Hern dissented and argued that a
plaintiff alleging malice and reputational harm should be allowed
to plead presumed damages, with any actual damages to be
decided by a jury who could determine the value of the harm.
Of the justices voting for the plaintiff in Mancuso, two -
O'Hern and Garibaldi - are gone, and O'Hern was the lone
dissenter in Rocci. The meanings of these cases have yet to
become clear, though three recent decisions may be an indication
of the Court's thinking. With all the Justices except Verniero
(who did not participate) joining, the Court (through Justice
Long) in Amedio v. Beuchamp,150 found "extraordinary
circumstances" and allowed the plaintiff to pursue a claim
against a state agency under the state Tort Claims Act that
otherwise would have been barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court found that incorrect advice from her attorney as to the
meritorious nature of the claim, and the reliance of plaintiff upon
that advice, constituted a sufficient showing to allow plaintiff to
proceed.
In Caravaggio v. D'Agostin151 and Aden v. Forts, 152 Verniero
and LaVecchia dissented from decisions that allowed plaintiffs to
bring their cases despite technical and substantive hurdles. In
Caravaggio, the Court, relying in part on Mancuso, allowed a
plaintiff to proceed against her doctor despite the statute of
limitations because although the plaintiff knew she had been
injured and that someone was at fault, she "was not aware that
the injury was additionally due to her physician's avoidable
fault."1 53 Aden eliminates the defense of comparative fault in
actions against professionals. In Aden, the plaintiffs failed to
read their home insurance policy, which covered damages in an
149 See id.; see also 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (defining "actual malice" as having
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
See generally Brian Markovitz, Public School Teachers as Plaintiffs in Defamation Suits:
Do They Deserve Actual Malice 88 GEO. L.J. 1953, 1955-61 (2000) (discussing actual
malice standard and its application to public school teachers); Mike Steenson, Defamation
Per Se: Defamation By Mistake 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 779, 785-86 (discussing N. Y
Times, and requirement to prove actual malice for public officials to recover damages).
150 751 A.2d 1047 (N.J..2000).
151 765 A.2d 182 (N.J. 2001).
152 776 A.2d 792 (N.J. 2001).
153 Caravaggio, 765 A.2d at 188.
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amount far less than they thought. The plaintiffs sued their
insurance broker. The Court affirmed the high standard it has
imposed on professionals, stating that "a plaintiffs conduct
cannot be charged as negligence in actions in which the plaintiff
failed to detect error in the discharge of the very responsibility
[the plaintiff] hired a professional to perform."154 Verniero, joined
by LaVecchia and Coleman, dissented on the grounds that the
Court's decision relieved insured of the responsibility to read
their policies and conflicted with the public policy of writing
insurance policies in clear language for the benefit of
nonprofessional insured. 155
Where the activities of the private sector spill over into the
public, the Court continues to adhere to its strong precedents
protecting employees and allowing them to exonerate a public
interest free of fear of termination. In 1995, Pinello
characterized the New Jersey Court's position as innovative, due
to its 1980 decision in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,156
which eliminated at-will termination of employment where the
termination is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.157
This language was subsequently codified in the Conscientious
Employees Protection Act, known as "CEPA."158 CEPA cases
continue to take up significant space on the Court's docket, and
have been decided generally in favor of plaintiffs. 159
In Mehlman v. Mobil Oil,160 the first major CEPA case decided
under Poritz, the Court found that knowledge of a specific public
policy was not required, so long as the plaintiff reasonably
believed that the defendant's action was violating some public
policy. The 1999 Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospita'6l decision
154 Aden, 776 A.2d at 805.
155 Id. at 806 (Verniero, J., dissenting).
156 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
157 See id. at 512 (indicating holding of case); see also Daniel R. Pinello, The Impact of
Judicial-Selection Method on State Supreme Court Policy 48-49 (1995). See generally
Elizabeth H. Confer, Tenth Circuit Surveys: Employment Law, 76 DENV. U.L. REV. 805,
809 (1999) (discussing the decision in Pierce as articulating and creating public policy "as
a cause of action for wrongful discharge").
158 N.J. Stat. § 34:19-3 (2000).
159 See Rosemary Alito, Another Very Good Year for Plaintiffs, 161 N.J.L.J. 981
(2000) (discussing how CEPA was created to protect employee-plaintiffs who report illegal
and unethical activities in workplace); see, e.g., Higfgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital, 730
A.2d 327 (N.J. 1999) (indicating success of plaintiff in CEPA claim).
160 707 A.2d 1000 (N.J. 1998).
161 730 A.2d 327 (N.J. 1998).
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affirmed that CEPA prohibits termination of an employee for
reporting a co-employee's behavior, even where the employer did
not know of the behavior. Also, in Roach v. TRW, Inc.,162 decided
this year, the Court upheld a jury verdict where the employee
presented evidence of wrongful termination, but on the basis of
acts not necessarily impacting upon public policy. Such conduct
fell within other prongs of CEPA for which the jury found
sufficient evidence existed. Although O'Hern and Handler
dissented in Mehiman, on the grounds that the public policy
relied on by the jury in reaching its decision was not specific
enough as a matter of law, Higgins and Roach were both
unanimous.
MehIman, Higgins and Roach all favored plaintiffs vindicating
their right to bring to the attention of their supervisors and
derivatively the public matters of concern without fear of
retribution. The one crack in the uniform approach to CEPA
claims the Court has adopted appeared in Fleming v.
Correctional Healthcare.163. There, while agreeing with the
general interpretation of the law given by the majority, Chief
Justice Poritz and Justice Verniero dissented from the per
curiam opinion that the Court should be careful lest CEPA be
invoked merely to protect "insubordinate or poor performers."
The dissenters' position, should it ultimately prevail, may herald
a stricter review of the plaintiffs case before allowing CEPA
claims to proceed.
Another emerging point of contention is in the area of jury
instructions, specifically the so-called "ultimate outcome"
instruction. In Wanetick v. Gateway Mitsubishi,164 the Court,
through Justice Verniero held that in cases brought pursuant to
the Consumer Fraud Act, juries should be instructed that the Act
provides for treble damages and counsel fees should the plaintiff
prevail. Verniero reasoned that some jurors might have
knowledge of how the statute operates and so would be confused
were they not instructed regarding it. In response to the
argument, raised in the dissent, that knowledge of the Act's
provisions would affect the jury's damages award, the Court
162 754 A.2d 544 (N.J. 2000).
163 751 A.2d 1035 (N.J. 2000).
164 750 A.2d 79 (N.J. 2000).
688 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMIENTARY
relied on the jurors' good faith against prejudicial findings. 165
Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that allowing the jury to
know about the treble damages provision would prejudice their
fact-finding as to compensatory damages (in that juries might
decrease an otherwise adequate compensatory award if they
know that the "real" amount will be triple), and does not in any
way aid their determinations.1 66  Wanetick can be read as
"balancing the scales" for defendants against an earlier opinion of
the Court, Roman v. Mitchell,167 which held that jurors must be
informed that under New Jersey's comparative fault scheme, a
plaintiff found more than fifty percent liable for his own damage
will be precluded from recovery.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The New Jersey Supreme Court was expected to change under
Chief Justice Poritz. In particular, the Court was expected to
reverse what some saw as the activist or liberal trends of the
"New Judicial Federalism" characteristic of the Wilentz Court.
While we have seen some shifting in what may be termed a
conservative direction, some of these changes predated Chief
Justice Poritz. For example, the Megan's Law cases represented
to some a more deferential view toward the legislature and a
more sympathetic view toward the rights of victims than the
rights of defendants. Overall, however, the Court seems
committed, at least for now, to follow its precedents.
The foregoing review of cases in selected areas seems to
indicate that the Court is holding, in general, its traditional
course as a progressive state supreme court. The Court has kept
to its precedents favoring state authority over local autonomy,
and the values of national regulation over state preemption. The
165 Id. at 84 (addressing concern argued by dissent); see also Rocco Cammarere,
Consumer Fraud Trials; Jury Must Know of Potential Trebling, N.J. LAW., May 15, 2000,
at 4 (discussing majority's belief that informing juries of treble damage provision is
acceptable); Molly J. Liskow, Consumer Protection; Jury In a Consumer Fraud Case Must
Be Instructed That Award Will Trigger a Punitive Remedy, N.J. LAWYER, May 15, 2000,
at 34 (stating any uneasy feelings court had were allayed by good faith of jurors).
166 See Wanetick, 750 A.2d at 86-7 (Coleman, J., dissenting) (reasoning jury
knowledge of treble damage provision is irrelevant); see also Steven P. Bann, Wanetick v.
Gateway Mitsubishi et al, A-106 September Term 1998, N.J.L.J., May 15, 2000, at 640
(restating Justice Coleman's opinion that plaintiffs may be negatively affected by
informing juries about treble damages).
167 413 A.2d 322, 342 (1980).
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effects of Abbott and Proportionality Review are still unclear, but
may represent confidence to let the state authorities proceed at
their own pace with less intensive oversight from the judiciary.
On individual rights, the Court has decided (at least for now)
to retain its supplemental approach of assessing rights claims as
a way of expanding the range of individual rights recognized in
New Jersey.168 Dale and Farmer should assuage any fear of a
retreat from a vigorous protection of certain rights. Similarly,
Hartz affirms that political expression will be allowed in any
place that opens itself to the public, and may not be unduly
restricted by private owners of quasi-public spaces such as
shopping malls. Where local sensibilities come into play,
however, especially regarding issues that impact upon local
conceptions of morality, Schad may foreshadow a slight retreat
from an expansive view of expressive rights. Poritz' initial
decisions, JG. and PBA Local, may indicate that the Court will
be more comfortable in importing federal standards wholesale,
which may indicate an implicit dissatisfaction with the
"supplemental" approach, especially where the national
precedent seems to be moving in a more conservative direction.169
The cases also reveal a slight reluctance developing to let
plaintiffs proceed without hindrance to their claims. Wanetick
may represent a more favorable understanding of the position of
defendants, especially in the face of potentially large judgments.
Overall, however, this reluctance has not borne much fruit. The
precedents of Blakey, Mancuso and the CEPA cases will likely
endure. Further, as in FG., the Court has clearly endorsed new
causes of action in the interest of fairness and the recognition of
changing standards of culpable behavior. 170
168 See generally Mulcahey, supra note 7, at 867-71 (noting New Jersey courts afford
broader rights to individuals in search and seizure cases, as well as providing more
protection to victims in rape cases). But cf Folster, supra note 21, at 1541 (concluding
New Jersey Supreme Court does not always rely on state constitutional guarantees and
adding "there have certainly not been many shining examples of independent state
constitutional adjudication from the New Jersey Supreme Court").
169 See Scott Carbone, Note, The Unreasonable Expectation of Pivacy: The "Mew"
New Jersey Supreme Court Reevaluates State Constitutional Protections, 30 SETON HALL
L. REV. 361, 388 (1999) (discussing New Jersey Supreme Court's potential for transition
to conservative path due to departure of more activist justices).
170 One question that deserves some additional attention as the Poritz Court further
develops its jurisprudence is whether these Justices will speak, as Suzanna Sherry
characterized it in an article on Justice O'Connor, in a particularly "feminine voice." See
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543, 605-10 (1986) (discussing Justice O'Connor's feminine perspective in
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emphasizing community, virtue, and contextual approaches to certain legal issues).
While the Court has always been seen as sensitive to the rights of women, it had its first
woman Justice only in 1982, when Justice Garibaldi joined the bench. Now there are
three, Justices Long and LaVecchia in addition to the Chief Justice.
While studies concentrating on individual female judges have illuminated their
approaches to state constitutional interpretation, a definitive analysis of a feminine voice
in state supreme courts has not emerged. See Linda B. Martarese, Other Voices: The
Role of Durham, Kaye, and Abramson in Shaping the "New Judicial Federalism' 2
EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. LAw 238 (1989).
A rigorous, empirical inquiry therefore might have interesting results in this debate, as
predictions on how a female justice might vote may differ from the reality. For example,
in Konzeiman v. Konzelman, 729 A.2d 7, 17 (N.J. 1999). Chief Justice Poritz and Justice
Garibaldi voted with the majority in affirming a decision upholding cohabitation clauses
in divorce settlements. Justice O'Hern and Justice Stein, in a vigorous dissent,
characterized the majority's holding as "turn[ing] back the clock on years of efforts to
improve the economic and social status of divorced women." Id. at 17. Such provisions
may have the effect, the dissent charged, of inappropriate inquiry into the private lives of
divorced women, and ignoring their real economic needs. Applying a feminist
methodology to the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinions, therefore, may shed additional
light on the scholarship of the "feminine voice" in the state court context.
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